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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide a detailed analysis of the process
of segregation formation. The claim is that segregation does not originate
from prejudice or exogenous psychological factors. Rather it is the product
of strategic interactions among social groups in a setting where one group
has captured power. While using a model featuring random matching and
repeated games, it is shown that whenever one group seizes power, mem-
bers of other groups will perceive additional value in forging long term
relationships with the mighty. They will systematically cooperate with
the latter either because it is in their interest to do so or because they do
not have other choice. The mighty natural response to this yearning to
cooperate is to refuse intergroup relationships. The dominated group will
best reply to this new situation by in turn rejecting the relationships and
a segregation equilibrium emerges. Segregation stems from the system-
atic cooperation by one group with another. However, not all societies
that have experienced power captures converge towards segregation. It is
shown that the proportion of individuals that are actually powerful within
the mighty group determines convergence towards segregation.
Contact information: Catherine Bros, Maison des Sciences Economiques, Bureau 225,
106-112 Boulevard de lHopital, 75013 Paris. e-mail: cathbros@yahoo.fr
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1 Introduction
Inequalities dened as an unequal distribution of valued attributes such as
wealth or power have been often seen as the origin of prejudice and its corol-
lary: discrimination. Becker (1957) nds that discrimination is rooted in an
exogenous taste for discrimination, or we could say prejudice, that springs from
the cultural arena. Arrow (1973) nds that discrimination makes up for a lack
of information regarding individuals capacities. As an employer may not be
able to test individually candidatesskills, he would approximately assess them
at the average skillslevel of the candidates group or by resorting to cognitive
dissonance when his perception is at odds over reality. In these two theories
and their later developments, inequalities give rise to prejudice that, in turn
create discrimination. However, the very origin of prejudice has rarely been
delved into by economists. The latter have often given up investigating this
question, treating prejudice as a disconcerting phenomenon that belongs to a
peripheral eld : a society specic culture. It seems that one step is missing in
the argument that is to demonstrate how inequalities can generate such a large
cleavage within a society that antagonism and rejection among groups and as a
result prejudice appear. We intend to show in this article how inequalities and
more specically unequal power distribution across groups may give rise to a
segregation equilibrium. Our assumption is that prejudice and discrimination
are the logic outcome of identitary phenomena, that stems from a deep cleavage
in society whose utmost form is segregation. Therefore, through the study of the
creation of segregation, we may be able to understand the forming of prejudice.
Our work aims at showing that segregation may pre-exist prejudice. Works in
the wake of Schellings (1978) segregation theory have shown that a segregation-
ist equilibrium may appear even in the absence of discriminatory dispositions,
or even when agents have pro-integrationnist preferences. Such an equilibrium
is the product of individualsstrategic decisions, who do not perceive the general
e¤ect of the sum of their microdecisions. This impact may often widely di¤er
from their individual motives. In this article, we signicantly concur on this
view by considering that segregation is an equilibrium produced by the junction
of individual rational decisions that have nothing to do with discriminatory in-
tentions. Discrimination here should be understood as a negative treatment an
individual receive due to its social or ethnic origin, its sex, etc.
We need to make clear what is understood here by segregation. This term
has often been reduced to its spatial denition in economics works. Authors have
mainly focussed on the fact for example that blacks and whites do not live in the
same neighborhood, do not attend the same schools, etc. However, we argue that
this term should be taken here in a broader sense. We dene segregation as a
refusal by members of di¤erent groups or communities to interact. Such a refusal
may manifest itself through marriage decisions or by choosing a neighborhood
or friendscompany. Spatial segregation is only a specic case of this refusal to
interact with members of another social or ethnic group.
It is striking that authors who investigated segregation phenomena addressed
only three kinds of issues: (i) how is segregation perpetuated and why doesnt
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it collapse? (ii) How could segregation be measured, and what point has it
reached? How has it evolved over time especially in the United States? (iii)
What are the properties of segregation equilibria? Works on segregation may
be grouped in three kinds along these three types of questions. Studies that
intend to explain why do agents choose strategies that allow them to avoid
contacts with members of another communities are few.
As far as the rst issue is concerned, a couple of economists have tried to show
how a society could move from a segregation equilibria to a more mixed one and
vice versa. Akerlof in his 1976 and 1980 papers, identied some of the factors
that prevent the caste system from collapsing but did not look into the forming of
the caste institution. Lundberg and Starz in a 1998 paper presented a model that
aim at explaining how segregation reinforce itself through prejudice. Chaudhuri
and Sethi (2003) showed how neighborhood e¤ects perpetuate segregation, while
Loury (2000) emphasized the concept of social capital. Most of these works do
raise the question of the persistence of segregation but not of its origin. Sethi
and Somanathan did approach this issue in a paper published in 2004. They
found that segregation "can be stable when racial income disparities are either
very great or very small, but instable in some intermediate range. And small
income disparities can give rise to multiple equilibria, with segregation and
integration both being stable". Even though these authors pointed out factors
that make a society move from a segregation equilibrium to integration, this
work exhibit one major drawback: it only depict movements of an already
segregated society. The model fails to explain how segregation is produced ex
nihilo but show how a society may return to its original situation. These types
of analysis focus on societies that have segregation conditions already embedded
in them and provide little help in explaining the occurrence of these conditions.
However, these studies are helpful at establishing relationships between levels
of segregation and other variables such as income distribution within and across
groups.
The second kind of issue regards segregation measurement and calls for em-
pirical studies. These works have mainly focused on either spatial segregation
or labour market discriminations since these are the most tangible forms of seg-
regation and almost the only viable source of data. Such pieces of work are
legion.
The third group of studies do not address in our view the issue of the segre-
gation origin but rather look into the e¢ ciency of segregation equilibria. Studies
undertook by Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1997, 2007) are good examples. The
work undertook by Eeckhout (2006) on which our model is based, does push the
analysis quite far but nally fails to explain why do agents adopt segregationist
strategies. In his article segregationist strategies are exogenous. The author is
most concerned with the stability and Pareto e¢ ciency features of a segregation
equilibrium.
Schellings works are an interesting exception to the three groups mentioned
above. Schelling brilliantly managed to show how a segregation equilibrium
may be produced by the junction of decisions made by individuals who do have
only very mild preferences regarding whom they interact with. Nevertheless,
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such preferences need to be specied in his model. The question as to why do
individuals prefer a certain proportion of their likes in their neighborhood is left
open. Again there seems to be a missing link in our search for the very origin
of segregation. We rmly share Schellings view that segregation is generated
by individual strategic decisions that did not intend to be discriminatory and
that segregation may preexist prejudice. Indeed the objective of this article is
to show that inequalities create a cleavage (through a process that will be laid
out in this article). Such a cleavage generates identitary responses and prejudice
that in turn will lead to discriminatory practices as described by either Becker
or Arrow.
As our stand is that segregation is produced by individual strategic deci-
sions, game theory models seem appropriate tools to analyze the conditions
under which this equilibrium appears. The model used in this paper relates
to the literature on random matching and repeated games. In this research
eld, the main question is how do individuals create and maintain long term
relationships that are at odds with selsh individual motives. This problem is
center to the study of segregation, as the latter may be viewed as a systematic
rejection of any form of cooperation among two social groups. One solution
to this problem provided by repeated game theory is that cooperation arises
from a punishment threat such as reputation loss or social norms (Rosenthal
and Landau 1979). This paper aims at showing that norms such as ostracism
are the consequences and not the origins of a particular equilibrium, contrary
to Lundberg and Startz position (2004). Ellison (1994), Kranton (1996), Ghosh
and Ray (1996) provide solutions to the cooperation emergence puzzle. Their
models show that cooperative equilibrium may arise despite the absence of in-
formation ows among individuals and provided that players are su¢ ciently
uncertain about their partnersvaluation of future transactions, and that coop-
eration payo¤s increase over time. These main features are accounted for in the
model used in this paper. The originality of this paper lies in the fact that we
do not assume that prejudice, discrimination or to some extent hierarchy exist
prior to the formation of the segregation equilibrium.
Although the model presented here is close to the one used in Eeckhout
(2006), it di¤ers by the fact that agentschoices between segregationist and non
discriminatory strategies are endogenized. The main example that will be used
in the article is the caste system in India, while it is believed that the analysis
could be applied to many other segregated societies such as colonial societies for
example. Indeed many anthropologists support the theory according to which
the formation of one of the most perfect form of segregation, the caste system in
India, arose from the invasion by the Aryan in India some 3 600 years ago who
progressively took over most of the sub-continents resources. Relationships
between individuals considered here are analyzed through marriage decisions
while it could be generalized to many other types of relationships.
Section 2 gives an account of the models main features and depicts equilib-
rium conditions assuming that social group membership has inuence neither
on strategies nor on pay o¤s. In section 3 it is assumed that one group captures
most of the power. The other group will perceive additional benets in entering
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into long-term relationships with them. Members of the powerless group will
start systematically cooperating when matched with a member of the power-
ful group and the latter will best reply to this new situation by systematically
rejecting any cooperation with the powerless. A stable segregation equilibrium
will appear. Section 4 addresses the following question: why do some societies
converge towards a segregation equilibrium while other move towards mixed
equilibrium? It is argued that power distribution within the powerful group
triggers segregation. Section 5 discusses the ndings and provides selected his-
torical examples. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Basic hypothesis
Consider a society with a continuum of innitely lived agents. In each period
a mass one of the agents is born. Time is discrete. At the beginning of each
t period, agents are either single or matched in pairs. Two social groups are
present in society: Ls and Hs and no individual can possibly hide his mem-
bership to one group that is costlessly observable. The proportion of Hs in
the society is denoted : The model is symmetric prisoners dilemma. In this
section we suppose that social group membership has no impact on the game
payo¤s. The importance of group memberships is analyzed in the following sec-
tion. Individuals are randomly matched in pairs. Each individual while being
in a relationship with another can choose between the action C which implies
cooperation, or D, non-cooperation. When making the decision of action, each
individual is unaware of his partners simultaneous action decision. The action
couple fC;Cg means that both partners cooperate, while fC;Dg, means that
the non cooperative individual who played D free rides his cooperative partner.
The fD;Dg action couple means that both partner refuse to cooperate. Hence
the prisoners dilemma action space is A = fC;Dg  fC;Dg. The stage game
pay o¤ function  : A! R2 is as follows:
C D
C 1; 1  l; 1 + g
D 1 + g;  l 0; 0
where g > 0, l > 0. We assume g   l  1:
The action couple fD;Dg with payo¤s (0; 0) is the only Nash and dominant
strategy equilibrium. In this section, given that social group membership does
not have any impact on the payo¤s, it will be assumed that individuals will not
condition their action decisions on their partnerssocial group, name or type.
This situation will be investigated in section 3.
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2.2 Game lay-out
The game has numerous stages. The rst phase could be identied as the
"meeting period" where both individuals make their action decision without
knowing the partners decision. The outcome is observed by both individuals at
the end of each stage of the game. Depending on the outcome, they individually
decide whether they terminate the relationship. If at least one partner decides
to terminate the match, the partnership is dissolved and a new match is formed
in the second period. It is assumed that if one partner has played D, the match
is terminated by the other partner. Hence a match could only go on if both
partners have played C at each stage of the game. The pay o¤ of any s strategy
over the repeated game is denoted by (s) and players discount the future at a
common factor  < 1: The objective of the player is to maximize the normalized
sum
(s) = E(1  )P t(s)
The normalization allows us to compare the repeated game pay o¤ directly
with the stage game pay o¤.
2.3 Equilibrium condition
We assume that individuals are not allowed to condition their actions on their
historical actions in past partnerships and have no information about their part-
ners actions in previous matches. Therefore, should a partner deviate and play
D, the match is dissolved and the deviator can not be punished for its deviation
beyond the termination of the match. Individuals will therefore be tempted
to adopt a systematically non-cooperative strategy (systematically play D) and
no cooperation can occur. In order to reach a certain level of cooperation a
no-deviation constraint must be placed on strategies that is to say, the pay o¤
from deviating should be inferior to the cooperation pay o¤.
2.4 No deviation constraint denition
Given an innite horizon, pay o¤ from cooperation is 1. pay o¤ from deviation
(D) can be written as
D = (1 + g)(1  ) + (s);
In a rst period the deviator free rides his partner and receives 1 + g dis-
counted by the factor (1  ) and has to start a partnership anew whose pay o¤
will be (s) discounted back by the factor . The no deviation constraint re-
quires the pay o¤ from deviation (D) to be lower than the pay o¤ from eternal
cooperation that is to say 1. The non deviation constraint can be written thus:
D  1 or (s)  1  g 1 
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In other words, a s strategy may be considered as an equilibrium strategy
provided its pay o¤ (s) is lower than 1   g 1  = V i.e. provided that the
no-deviation constraint is respected. Should a strategy pay o¤ be greater than
V , then any player would systematically deviate from the equilibrium strategy
that is play C until a deviation occurs. A player who adopts a strategy s such
as (s) > V will systematically play D and no equilibrium can occur.
2.5 Equilibrium strategies denitions
Suppose players i and j enter into a relationship.
Lets note for player i the pay o¤ from playing C by Fi(s) at one stage of
the game and the the pay o¤ from playing D by Gi(s);where:
Fi(s) = j + (1  j)[(1  )( l) + (s)]
As Fi(s) is considered, player i plays C with certainty. His partner j plays
C with a probability j : In this case, the outcome of the stage game would be
fC;Cg and player i will receive a pay o¤ of 1. Hence the rst term on the right
side of the equation (j): Should partner j choose to play D with a probability
(1   j); the outcome of the stage game would be fC;Dg and player i would
be free ridden by his partner j (j is not cooperative while i is). Player i would
receive in a rst stage  l discounted at a factor (1  ). Given that D had been
played, a new match would be formed in the future whose pay o¤ will be (s)
discounted at the rate :
Gi(s) = j [(1  )(1 + g) + (s)] + (1  j)(s)
Similarly, player i is now assumed to play D. His partner j plays C with a
probability j ; in which case, i would free ride j and receive (1 + g) in a rst
stage discounted at a factor (1   ) and a new partnership would have to be
formed given that the outcome is fC;Dg: If partner j decides on playing D
(probability 1   j), then the outcome would be fD;Dg; and player i would
receive 0 in a rst stage and a new partnership would have to be formed in the
future which pay o¤ will be (s) discounted at the  rate.
Then the expected pay o¤ for a newly matched individual i at the beginning
of the game is
(s) = iF (s) + (1  i)G(s)
where i is the probability that individual i will choose to play C.
Best equilibrium strategies s are found by solving the following problem
s 2 arg max (s);
s.t. (s)  V
and in addition, supposing indi¤erence between the pay o¤ of playing C and
D if j 2 (0; 1): Note that if the partner j plays C with certainty, i would no
longer be indi¤erent between playing C and D and will choose D with certainty.
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We suppose that when at equilibrium, social group membership does not
make a di¤erence in the choice of strategies. This equilibrium will be named a
"group-blind equilibrium". Specically, the probability for a player to play C
or D does not depend on the social origin of the partner.
3 Formation of a segregation equilibrium
3.1 Introduction of an attractive feature of group H
So far, social group has had no incidence on partnership formation. Lets assume
from now on that one group, the Hs, monopolize all the economic resources.
For example, the Hs may invade the Lscountry and seize most of the land or
political power. Entering into a relationship such as marriage with an H may
bring additional opportunities to an L. Ls will perceive additional value in a
long-term relationship with Hs. In the context of India for example, a low caste
father may be eager to have his daughter married to a higher caste man as such
an alliance may give his own family, or if not his direct family his lineage, access
to better opportunities. This may be true beyond the context of marriage.
International trade literature has shown that less developed countries are more
eager to trade with developed countries as these relationships give them access
to products of di¤erent quality. This additional value perceived is symbolized
by parameter z in the pay o¤ matrix. It is worth noticing that this additional
parameter only appears on the L side in a H-L relationship. Intragroup payo¤s
and Hs payo¤s are unchanged. Payo¤s for a H-L match are represented in the
matrix below:
pay o¤ to the L
pay o¤ to the H C D
C 1; 1 + z  l; 1 + g
D 1 + g;  l 0; 0
3.2 Impact of the parameter z on relationships payo¤s
Lets note FH=L the pay o¤ from playing C to a member of the H group when
matched to a partner drawn from the L group. Similarly GL=H is the pay o¤
from playing D to a member of the L group when matched to a partner from
the H group. Please note that the introduction of the parameter z only modies
the pay o¤ from playing C to an L who meets an H i.e. FL=H : All other payo¤s
remain identical as in section 2.5. For the sake of clarity the four possible cases
are laid out below.
3.2.1 Pay o¤ to an H individual in a H-L relationship
FH=L = L=H + (1  L=H)[(1  )( l) + H(s)]
Where FH=L is the pay o¤ from playing C to an H who meets an L.
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L=H is the probability that the L partner plays C given the fact that he is
matched to an H. Should this case occur it means that both partners would have
played C; pay o¤ to the H would be 1 and the partnership is never dissolved.
Should the L partner choose to play D (probability 1   L=H ), the H would
be free ridden by the L, earn  l in the rst period (hence the (1  ) discount
factor), the relationship would be terminated and a new match formed whose
pay o¤ to the H would be H(s) discounted at a factor :
Symmetrically, pay o¤ from playing D to an H who meets an L is
GH=L(s) = L=H [(1  )(1 + g) + (s)] + (1  L=H)H(s)
L=H the probability that the L plays C when matched to an H. In this event,
H would have played D and L, C. H would earn 1 + g in the rst period and
the match would break up. If the L individual chooses to play D (probability
(1  L=H)), the action couple fD;Dg would appear. In this case no one would
receive any payment in the rst period, the relationship would be terminated
and the H would start a new match whose discounted pay o¤ is H(s):
The expected pay o¤ for an H that is newly matched to an L is therefore
H=L(s) = H=LFH=L(s) + (1  H=L)GH=L(s)
where H=L is the probability that the H chooses to play C given the fact
that the other player is drawn from the L group.
3.2.2 Pay o¤ from intragroup relationships
Intragroup relationship payo¤s are derived in the same way as above
For an H meeting an H
FH=H(s) = H=H + (1  H=H)[(1  )( l) + H(s)]
GH=H(s) = H=H [(1  )(1 + g) + H(s)] + (1  H=H)H(s)
H=H(s) = H=HFH=H(s) + (1  H=H)GH=H(s)
For an L meeting an L
FL=L(s) = L=L + (1  L=L)[(1  )( l) + L(s)]
GL=L(s) = L=L[(1  )(1 + g) + L(s)] + (1  L=L)L(s)
L=L(s) = L=LFL=L(s) + (1  L=L)GL=L(s)
3.2.3 Pay o¤ to L individual in an H-L relationship
Pay o¤ from playing C to an L member matched to an H is somewhat di¤erent
due to the introduction of the parameter z.
FL=H = H=L(1 + z) + (1  H=L)[(1  )( l) + L(s)]
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If the L partner chooses to play C and the H partner is also cooperative
(probability H=L) then a long-term relationship may be set up and the L in-
dividual will gain 1 from the partnership plus all the additional opportunities
such a partnership may provide him with. The value of these additional oppor-
tunities is estimated by the parameter z. Note that this parameter plays a role
only if the action couple fC;Cg is the outcome.
Pay o¤ from playing D to an L matched to an H is similar to those occurring
in intragroup matches.
GL=H(s) = H=L[(1  )(1 + g) + L(s)] + (1  H=L)L(s)
The expected pay o¤ for an L who is newly matched to an H is therefore
L=H(s) = L=HFL=H(s) + (1  L=H)GL=H(s)
We mentioned in section 2 that at the group blind equilibrium, i.e. prior to
the introduction of the parameter z, players do not condition their strategies on
the social origin of their partner. Therefore L=H = L=L: Now that z has been
introduced in the pay o¤ matrix, it can be argued that L players will modify
their probability to play C when matched to an H.
3.3 Systematic cooperation from the Ls leads to a segre-
gation equilibrium
It is quite obvious that the introduction of the z parameter increases Lspoten-
tial payo¤s. In the event of a match with an H they do not only benet from
the value of the match itself but also from additional social opportunities such
a relationship may bring them. The intuition is as follows: Ls individuals have
a strong interest in building long-term relationships with H members. They are
enticed to cooperate when matched to an H in order to maximize the chance
of having a long term relationship. The probability to play C for an L meeting
an H increases up to 1 as a consequence of the introduction of the parameter z.
Now that the H individual knows for certain that the L partner will cooperate,
he has no incentive anymore to cooperate. He would be better o¤ by system-
atically free riding his cooperative partner. In this case, the only equilibrium
strategy will be for the H to systematically reject any cooperation with an L.
The nal equilibrium situation is the one where a guaranteed cooperation from
one group leads the other group to systematically reject any relationship with
this group. Perfect segregation has emerged and in the aftermath prejudice that
reinforces segregation. It is rather counter intuitive to think that segregation
germinates from the yearning by one group to cooperate with another. Sev-
eral historical examples support this argument. It is striking that Portuguese
colonies contrary to the French and British ones, were not segregated. While
the Portuguese mainly set up trading posts, the French and the British led an
active power and wealth takeover policy. In the french and british empires,
natives had to be cooperative with the new masters to secure social opportuni-
ties, while in Portuguese colonies trade enabled locals to make social progress
10
on their own. In the rst case, segregationist ideologies appeared while in the
second a more integrated situation prevailed. More historical examples will be
discussed in section 3.3.2. A formal demonstration of the argument is provided
below.
Proposition 1 The introduction of the parameter z increases the probability
for an L to play C when matched to an H up to 1 that is L=H = 1
We mentioned that an equilibrium condition must be the indi¤erence be-
tween the pay o¤ of playing C or D that is F (s) = G(s). If this condition was
not satised, a player would modify his probability to play C. For example, if
the pay o¤ from playing C increases comparatively to the pay o¤ from play-
ing D, (F (s) > G(s)) a player would adjust upward his propensity  to play
C, until the equality condition between F (s) and G(s) is restored. Lets note
 = F (s) G(s): We assume that @@ > 0.
The introduction of the parameter z alters the pay o¤ from playing C for an
L who is matched to an H. The L individual will therefore alter his probability
to play C (L=H) consequently. Lets note L=H = FL=H(s)   GL=H(s) then
@L=H
@L=H
> 0. and the following equation can be written:
@L=H
@z =
@L=H
@L=H
@L=H
@z
where we know that the rst term on the right hand side of the equation is
positive. The second term of the equation is also positive since the inclusion of
the parameter z has unilaterally increased FL=H(s) without altering GL=H(s):
Introducing the parameter z increases L=H i.e. the probability for an L who
meets an H to cooperate. An increase in L=H will alter the pay o¤ for the H
matched to an L to play C comparatively to playing D. H=L will be modied
and H=L will therefore be adjusted. A movement in H=L will modify in turn
L=H , and so on. So the total e¤ect on L=H due to the introduction of the
parameter z can be written:
@tL=H
@z =
@iL=H
@z +
@iL=H
@z
nP
j=1
(
@H=L
@L=H
@L=H
@H=L
)j =
@iL=H
@z (1 + n)
Where
@iL=H
@z is the initial impact of z on L=H and
@tL=H
@z is the total e¤ect
of the introduction of z. The introduction of z has two impacts:
- one with the direct increase of L=H via the increase of L=H
- one with the cumulative e¤ect of a positive shock on L=H
n is the number of periods in the game needed for players to adapt their
action strategies. It is argued that there exists n; so that L=H will move
from its group blind equilibrium level (L=H = L=L) to a new equilibrium level
L=H = 1: n
 is dened by the following equation:
@iL=H
@z (1 + n
)dz = 1  L=L
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Proposition 2 Whenever L=H = 1 the only possible equilibrium for an H-L
partnership is given by H=L = 0
Recall that in order for a strategy s to be an equilibrium strategy, the no
deviation constraint must be respected that is (s)  1  g (1 ) :
If L=H = 1,
FH=L = L=H + (1  L=H)[(1  )( l) + H(s)] = 1
GH=L(s) = L=H [(1  )(1 + g) + H(s)] + (1  L=H)H(s)
GH=L(s) = (1  )(1 + g) + H(s)
H=L(s) = H=LFH=L(s) + (1  H=L)GH=L(s)  1  g (1 )
H=L(s) = H=L + (1  H=L)[(1  )(1 + g) + H(s)]  1  g (1 )
After rearranging,
H=L[   g(1  )  H(s)]     g(1  )  H(s)  g (1 )
Recall that V = 1  g (1 ) ; then V =    g(1  )
H=L[][V   H(s)]  [][V   H(s)]  g (1 )
Recall that V is the non deviation constraint i.e. the highest attainable
pay o¤ for any equilibrium strategy. Therefore any player tries to minimize the
di¤erence V   H(s) under the constraint [][V   H(s)]  g (1 )  0: Indeed,
H=L[][V   H(s)] cannot be negative so 0  H=L[][V   H(s)]  [][V  
H(s)]  g (1 ) : If this constraint is respected then [][V   H(s)] lowest level
is g (1 ) . Minimizing [][V   H(s)] is equivalent to replacing the expression
by its minimum g (1 ) in the equation:
H=L[g
(1 )
 ]  0
[g (1 ) ] > 0 by denition
H=L  0 by denition.
The only strategy that maximizes the pay o¤ while respecting the no devia-
tion constraint is H=L = 0 when L=H = 1: However, whenever H=L 2 [0; 1[, an
equilibrium is attainable provided that L=H 2 [0; 1[. In other words, if a part-
ner cooperates for sure, the only strategy that guarantees both an equilibrium
and the other partners pay o¤ maximization is a systematic non-cooperative
behavior.
Once H=L = 0; i.e. the Hs play with certainty D when matched to an L,
Ls maximize their pay o¤ in such a match by setting their probability to play
C to 0 i.e. L=H = 0: Indeed, if H=L = 0
FL=H = (1  )( l) + L(s)
GL=H(s) = L(s)
L=H(s) = L=HFL=H(s) + (1  L=H)GL=H(s)
L=H(s) = L=H(1  )( l) + L(s)
Given that L=H(1  )( l)  0; L=H(s) is maximized by setting L=H = 0
It is worth noticing that whenever one of the partner plays D with certainty,
the other partner maximizes his pay o¤ while respecting the no-deviation con-
straint by setting his probability to play C at 0.
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3.3.1 Equilibrium stability
The equilibrium obtained here is a segregation equilibrium where members from
two groups systematically refuse to cooperate when matched to each other. The
path to the segregation equilibrium is as follows:
- one social group captures more power or economic resources. The other
group (the Ls) perceive additional benets from entering into long-term rela-
tionships with the previous group (the Hs) through additional opportunities or
may not have much choice but to cooperate to survive. The parameter z is
introduced in the matrix.
- the introduction of the parameter z increases the propensity of L group
members to cooperate with Hs, which increases the likelihood of a cooperation
from the Hs, which in turn raises the probability for Ls to play C, and so on.
At the end of n periods, Ls cooperate with certainty with Hs. At this time,
although the probability for Hs to play C has reached quite high levels, as soon
as H=L = 1; Hs have no equilibrium strategy available but to be systematically
non-cooperative with Ls, thus L=H = 0:
- Whenever H=L = 0; Ls maximize their payo¤s by choosing never to coop-
erate whenever matched to an L, thus L=H = 0
At the end of the n periods a segregation equilibrium prevails: members of
the two groups will systematically refuse to cooperate when matched to each
other. This result is rather interesting when thinking about the ambiguity one
may nd in the dominated groups attitudes towards dominant groups. Dom-
inated often wishes to conform to dominants (translating a will to cooperate)
while depreciating them when they feel theyre being rejected by the mighty.
As the fox in Aesop fable who can not reach grapes hanging high up on a vine,
that he eyed greedily retreats and says: "The grapes are sour anyway!".
As mentioned above, as soon as one partner sets his probability to play C
to 0, the other partner will reciprocate by setting his probability to play C to 0
and cannot be better o¤. Therefore L=H = 0; H=L = 0 is a stable equilibrium
on the L-H market. The path that leads to a segregation equilibrium is rather
interesting. Assuming that one group is deprived of power, it has not much choice
but to cooperate with another. We may conclude that given this systematic
cooperation, the latter will refuse any interaction with the rst one. Finally the
deprived groups best response will be to refuse any relationship too.
3.3.2 Segregation origin: economic circumstances and the domi-
nated group
Two interesting points stand out from the demonstration above. Firstly, segre-
gation is not the direct product of psychological and exogenous factors such as
prejudice or a taste for discrimination. Such a situation arises from a socioe-
conomic context in which one group has taken over much of the power, be this
power economic, political or to some extent symbolic. Indeed, many authors
have considered that segregation is the consequence of psychological factors or
social prejudice that are most of the time exogenous and in any case beyond
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the eld of economics. We have tried to show that an unequal economic oppor-
tunities distribution triggers social strategies that generate a stable segregation
equilibrium. Secondly, it has been shown that segregation does not originate
from a favored groups intention to put a deprived group at its mercy. On
the contrary, it is the systematic yearning or necessity by the latter to build
long-term relationship with the mighty that leads to a rejection by the favored
group of any relationship with the powerless. Although that result is in con-
ict with the generally accepted idea that segregation comes from the favored
group, there are many good historical examples, especially related to coloniza-
tion processes. Amartya Sen recounts in "The Argumentative Indian : Writings
on Indian History, Culture and Identity" an interesting story. At the time when
British trading posts were created in India in the XVIIth and early XVIIIth
centuries, some British actually settled into the sub-continent, married Indian
women and somewhat managed to mingle with the local society. Then came the
time of the proper colonization process in the XIXth century, when the Hon-
ourable East India Company and later the British government took over power
and wealth in the sub-continent. The locals had then to deal with the new
masters to secure social opportunities. At that time, a new ideology started to
appear in the Raj according to which India and its civilization were backward
and needed to be patronized. Indian and British communities were set aside
and any admitted relationship between the two was to be on a teaching mode.
The power takeover by the British led to a segregation between Europeans and
Indians that is well illustrated by novels from that time.
Although the demonstration above sheds an interesting light on the process
of segregation formation it fails to explain why some societies exhibit high levels
of segregation, as it is the case in India through the caste system, and other
societies lower levels of segregation. Indeed, in any society at least one group
is more dominant than the others but all societies do not move towards a seg-
regation equilibrium. The next section will try to identify factors that trigger
a segregation equilibrium. Power distribution within the favored group appears
to be the determining factor for a segregation equilibrium to occur
4 Segregation versus non segregation equilibria
Lets assume that Ls have access to additional social opportunities only when
establishing long-term relationships with powerful Hs who are in proportion 
2 [0; 1] in the H population and the Ls receive the same kind of pay o¤ as in
other relationship when matched to powerless Hs. The probability to gain z
for an L matched to an H depends on the proportion of powerful individuals in
the H population i.e. . The intuition tells us that the lower this probability,
the less inclined will be the L individuals to adjust upwards their probability to
cooperate. In other words, the lower ; the more limited the increase in L=H
due to the introduction of z. It will take a longer time for L=H to reach its
maximum value of 1. The time needed is called the "adaptation phase". In
the meantime, mixed H-L couples may be formed. We may realistically assume
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that a mighty H who forge a long term relationship with an L loses its power,
but remains an H. Indeed, lets take the example of an aristocrat who marries
a commoner. The odds are that he or his children will still be considered as
members of the nobility but somewhat of a second rate. Therefore as mixed
matches are made, the proportion  of powerful H decreases over time. Should
the adaptation phase be long enough, which is the case if the initial  is small,
the proportion of powerful H declines and converges to 0 before the segregation
equilibrium is triggered, i.e. before L=H = 1: At this point in time, there is
virtually no powerful H any more and the H group becomes similar to the L
group. Members of the latter do not perceive additional value in building long
term relationships with the Hs and the situation is back to the group blind
equilibrium. By intuition, we understand that the initial proportion of powerful
H is the determinant of the nal degree of segregation. A more formal argument
is presented in the following sections.
4.1 The impact of z is conditional upon the proportion of
powerful individuals within the H group.
Proposition 3 the impact of the parameter z on L=H is an increasing function
of the initial  (the proportion of powerful H within the H population).
Lets note t the time period, t the proportion of powerful H at time t; L=H;t
the probability an L plays C when matched to an H at time t; FL=H;t the pay
o¤ from playing C for L matched to an H at time t, L;t the strategy total pay
o¤ for a newly matched L at time t.
The pay o¤ from playing C for an L matched to an H at time t can be written
FL=H;t = H=L;t[(1 + z)t 1 + (1  t 1)] + (1  H=L;t)[(1  )( l) + L;t(s)]
An L is matched to an H at time t. L plays C with certainty. If H plays
C as well (probability H=L;t) and is powerful (probability t 1 which is the
proportion of powerful H within the H group at the start of the period hence
the subscript t 1), a long term relationship starts and the L receives 1+z. In the
case the L is matched to a powerless H and they start a long term relationship,
he receives the same pay o¤ as in a L-L relationship. In the event H plays D, a
new partnership must be formed.
The pay o¤ from playing D for an L matched to an H at time t can be
written
GL=H;t = H=L;t[(1  )(1 + g) + L;t(s)] + (1  H=L;t)[L;t(s)]
Total strategy pay o¤ for an L who is newly matched to an H at time t is
L=H;t(s) = L=H;tFL=H;t + (1  L=H;t)GL=H;t
The strategy total pay o¤ for a newly matched L is at time t
L;t(s) = tL=H;t(s) + (1  t)L=L;t(s)
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where t is the proportion of H in the society at period t, L=H(s) the
strategy pay o¤ for an L matched to an H and L=L(s) the strategy pay o¤ for
an L matched to another L for the period t.
Lets assume that the parameter z is introduced during the rst period i.e.;
for t = 1.
@L;1
@z = 1
@L=H;1
@z + (1  1)
@L=L;1
@z = 1
@L=H;1
@z
Note that the strategy pay o¤ for an L matched to an L is independent from
z; therefore @L=L@z = 0: As for the impact of z on the strategy pay o¤ for an L
matched to an H is as follows (it is assumed that in a rst phase L=H;1 is not
dependent on z as L=H;1 will be modied in the subsequent periods)
@L=H;1
@L = L=H;1[
@FL=H;1
@L  
@GL=H;1
@L ] +
@GL=H;1
@L
@FL=H;1
@L = H=L;10 + (1  H=L;1)()(@L;1(s)@L )
@GL=H;1
@L = 
@L;1(s)
@L
@L=H;1
@L = L=H;1H=L;1(0    @L;1(s)@L ) +  @L;1(s)@L
@L=H;1
@L = L=H;1H=L;1(0   1
@L=H;1
@L ) + 1
@L=H;1
@L
@L=H;1
@L =
0L=H;1H=L;1
1 1[1 L=H;1H=L;1]  0
Please note that the increase in the strategy pay o¤ due to the introduction
of z is now a function of 0; the proportion of powerful Hs at the outset of
the game. The higher this probability, the larger the impact of z on the pay
o¤ and arguably the larger the increase in the probability to play C for an L
matched with an H. Note that it is only the proportion  at the beginning of
the period when z is introduced that matters and not subsequent values of .
Indeed subsequent increases in L=H are only related to movements in H=L
that are linked to the initial move in L=H due to the introduction of z: Hence
only the initial value of  (i.e. 0) matters for the size of the increases in L=H :
To estimate the total impact of z on the probability that an L will play
C when matched to an H, we rst estimate the impact of z on L=H without
taking into account the cumulative e¤ect of an increase in L=H on H=L; and
so on.
We can write
@iL=H;1
@z =
@iL=H;1
@L=H;1
@L=H;1
@z
L=H;1 = FL=H;1  GL=H;1
@L=H;1
@z = H=L;10 + (1  H=L;1) @L;1@z    @L;1@z
@L=H;1
@z = H=L;1[0   1
@L=H;1
@z ]
@L=H;1
@z = H=L;1[0   1
0L=H;1H=L;1
1 1[1 L=H;1H=L;1] ]
@L=H;1
@z = H=L;10[
1 1
1 1[1 L=H;1H=L;1]] ]
@iL=H;1
@z =
@iL=H;1
@L=H;1
[H=L;10][
1 1
1 1[1 L=H;1H=L;1] ]
The same scheme as in section 3 applies. Any move in L=H will trigger a
change in H=L that in turn will modify L=H ; and so on. So the total e¤ect of
the introduction of z at period t can be written
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@tL=H;t
@z =
@iL=H;1
@z +
@iL=H;1
@z
nP
j=1
(
@H=L
@L=H
@L=H
@H=L
)j =
@iL=H;1
@z (1 + t)
@tL=H;t
@z =
@iL=H;1
@L=H;1
H=L;10[
1 1
1 1[1 L=H;1H=L;1] ](1 + t)
The larger 0; that is to say the initial proportion of mighty individuals
within the H group, the larger the impact of z on L=H : This result means that
if the proportion of powerful individuals within the H group is relatively small,
then the increase in H=L will be quite limited and it will take a rather long
time before it reaches its maximum value of 1. In the meantime, mixed long
term relationships may be formed.
4.2 Evolution of the proportion 
As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that a powerful H who enters into a long term
relationships with an L loses its power but not his H membership. Therefore
 the proportion of H in the population does not vary over time: t = .
During the period t; the proportion of mighty who are matched to L individuals
is 12t 1(1   ); where t 1 is the proportion of mighty individuals in the
society. The so matched L-H couple decide to cooperate with the probability
L=H;tH=L;t: The proportion of mighty among the H at period t (i.e. t) is
the proportion of powerful among the H for the previous time period minus the
proportion of powerful H who forged relationships with Ls, formally
t = t 1[1  12(1  )L=H;tH=L;t]
Lets note
pt = [1  12(1  )L=H;tH=L;t]
and rewrite
t = 0(p1)(p2)(p3)::::(pt)
Given that pt is lower than 1, t decreases over time but less and less rapidly
as L=H;1 increases over time. t decreases up to the time L=H;t reaches 1,
at which point segregation occurs and no mixed long term relationship may be
forged anymore. Note that when L=H;t reaches 1, t may still be quite large if
0 was large enough or t may be close to 0 if 0 was small enough (this point
will be shown in the next subsection). If t becomes su¢ ciently close to 0, Hs
are not more powerful than the L any more and the two groups become similar.
The Ls do not perceive additional value any more in building relationships with
the Hs, that is to say that the parameter z virtually disappears and the situation
moves back to a "group blind equilibrium".
4.3 Comparative evolution of the proportion t; when 0
is large or small
Recall that the smaller 0; the smaller the impact of z on L=H ; the longer the
time until L=H reaches 1. Lets consider two situations: one in which 0 is
small and noted 
0
0.
If 00 is small, then in virtue of proposition 3, we know that L=H;t will be
small and will be noted 0L=H;t. Lets note n
0 the number of periods necessary
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for 0L=H;t to reach 1. n
0 will be large.
In another case, lets note 
00
0 the large initial proportion of mighty individuals
among the Hs. 
00
L=H;t will be large and n
00
the number of periods necessary for

00
L=H;t to reach 1 small.
Proposition 4 if the initial proportion of powerful individuals within the H
population is small, i.e. 0 small, then by the time L=H reaches 1, which
occurs at period n, n may be close to 0. If n is close to 0, then the society
moves back to a "group blind equilibrium".
Lets note
p
0
t = [1  12(1  )
0
L=H;t
0
H=L;t]
p
00
t = [1  12(1  )
00
L=H;t
00
H=L;t]

0
n0

00
n
00
= (

0
0

00
0
)(
p
0
1
p
00
1
)(
p
0
2
p
00
2
)(
p
0
3
p
00
3
):::(
p
0
n
p00n
)(p0(n+1))(p
0
(n+2))(p
0
(n+3))::::(p
0
(n0))
Lets note
Un0 = (p
0
(n+1))(p
0
(n+2))(p
0
(n+3))::::(p
0
(n0))
and rewrite

0
n0

00
n
00
= (

0
0

00
0
)[(
p
0
1
p
00
1
)(
p
0
2
p
00
2
)(
p
0
3
p
00
3
):::(
p
0
n
p00n
)](Un0 )
From proposition 3, we know that

0
L=H;t
0
H=L;t < 
00
L=H;t
00
H=L;t
Hence
(
p
0
t
p
00
t
) > 1
We also know that Un0 converges towards 0. For n
0
su¢ ciently large rela-
tively to n
00
(which is the case when 
0
0 is small and 
00
0 is large), Un0 is close to
0. Thus, for 
0
0 small and 
00
0 large,

0
n0

00
n00
is close to 0. This may occur in two
ways: either 
00
n00 has become innitely large, or 
0
n0 is innitely small. The rst
case may not occur as 
00
t is a decreasing sequence whose maximum initial value
is 1. Therefore, 
0
n0 has become very small.
To put it all in a nutshell, if 
0
0 is su¢ ciently small, by the time 
0
L=H reaches
1 that ensures a segregation equilibrium, which occurs at the period n
0
, 
0
n0 will
be close to 0, meaning that virtually no H will be powerful. The Hs will not
di¤er from the Ls any more and the latter will not perceive additional value in
building relationships with them. The parameter z would disappear and the
situation would reach a group blind equilibrium. Segregation would not occur.
On the other hand, should 
00
0 be large enough, the society may be trapped in a
segregation equilibrium.
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4.4 Characterization of the comparative evolution of the
proportion ; when 0 is large or small
This section illustrates the evolution of  over time. We take as a base case
0 = 1 and decline it for di¤erent values of 0: Values are assigned to key
parameters such as ;
@iL=H;1
@z ;
@H=L
@L=H
and L=H;0 ,H=L;0 randomly. Note that
for the declined cases, @H=L@L=H , L=H;0 and H=L;0 are left unchanged (indeed
variations in 0 do not a¤ect the values of these parameters). By virtue of
proposition 3, we know that if for 0 = 1;
@iL=H;1
@z = x; then for a case where
0 = y; then
@iL=H;1
@z = xy: Therefore,
@iL=H;1
@z is adapted in this manner for
every variation of 0 made. The table below presents the values assigned to key
parameters in the base case:
Base Case: 0 = 1
Variable Value given1 Requirements
 0.3 2 [0; 1]
@iL=H;1
@z dz 0.06 2 [0; 1  L=H;0]
@H=L
@L=H
dL=H 0.4 2 [0; 1  H=L;0]
L=H;0 0.5 2 [0; 1] and indi¤erence between playing C and D
H=L;0 0.5 2 [0; 1] and indi¤erence between playing C and D
Table below presents summary calculations for the case 0 = 1. Segregation
in this case is triggered at period t = 9 and at this time  still represents 66%,
meaning that power is still largely shared by members of the H group.
Case 1: 0 = 1
Time Proportion of Probability to cooperate for an
period powerful individuals L matched to an H H matched to an L
t t = t 1[1  12(1  )L=H;tH=L;t] L=H;t H=L;t
0 100.00% 0.50 0.50
1 96.92% 0.56 0.52
2 93.46% 0.62 0.55
3 89.64% 0.68 0.57
.... ... ... ...
7 76.33¨ % 0.92 0.67
8 71.40% 0.98 0.69
9 66.32% 0.00 0.00
The table below illustrates the case for a small initial value of : Following
our argument, the time needed for L=H to reach 1 is much larger (83 periods
versus 9) and at the time segregation is triggered, the proportion of powerful
individuals is so low that the H group doesnt di¤er anymore from the L group.
A group blind equilibrium emerges.
1Detailed calculations and additionnal simulations are available upon request
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Case 2: 0 = 0:1
Time Proportion of Probability to cooperate for an
period powerful individuals L matched to an H H matched to an L
t t = t 1[1  12(1  )L=H;tH=L;t] L=H;t H=L;t
0 10.00% 0.500 0.500
1 9.73% 0.506 0.502
2 9.47% 0.512 0.505
3 9.21% 0.518 0.507
.... ... ...
80 0.20% 0.980 0.692
81 0.19% 0.986 0.694
82 0.18% 0.992 0.697
83 0.16% 0.00 0.00
The graph below depicts the evolution of the proportion of powerful indi-
viduals within the H group for every period of time i.e. t: For example in our
base case of 0 = 1; it is worth noticing that L=H reaches 1 and segregation is
triggered when t = 0:66: On the other hand, when 0 is small enough, say 20%
or 10%, L=H takes such a long time to reach 1, that t becomes close to 0 and
a group blind equilibrium is triggered. Indeed, as  approaches 0, the H group
does no longer di¤er from the L group and the situation is back to a group blind
equilibrium.
Evolution of  depending on its initial value
This gure illustrates our reasoning by showing that the initial proportion of
powerful individuals within the H group is the main determinant of a segregation
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equilibrium. This does not mean that segregation may be uprooted by changing
power distribution within the H group. It has been shown in a previous section
that once the segregation equilibrium is in place it is stable and robust. Our
argument only helps at explaining why do some societies exhibit high degrees
of segregation and other lower degrees of segregation. The reason advanced
is the following: when a group takes over most of the power within a society,
provided that this power is uniformly distributed within the dominant group
a segregation equilibrium is triggered. However, at the time of the takeover,
if only a minority captures this power within the dominant group, a group
blind equilibrium appears. For segregation to be uprooted, intuition tells us
that power need to be redistributed across the H and L group. We have not
provided any proof of this as we leave this question to future research. This may
explain why revolutions are the most common way to overthrow segregation.
5 Discussion and selected examples
Power distribution within one group determines whether a society moves toward
or away from a segregation equilibrium. The term power should be taken in a
broad acceptance, that is the ability for someone to give another person addi-
tional opportunities that are otherwise unreachable. We have shown that the
process through which segregation occurs starts with a dependence of one group
on another to gain access to additional opportunities. The deprived group will
start looking for long-term relationships with the more powerful group who in
turn will start setting up barriers. The caste system in India is a good example
of the move from one equilibrium to another from many standpoints.
When the Aryans settled in the sub continent some 4 000 years ago they
brought along a large corpus of religious texts: the Vedas. The rst text codi-
fying the caste system is known as Manus law and it is considered by tradition
as part of the Vedas. Many experts support the idea that Manus code was
written in a much later form of Sanskrit and is therefore more recent. Some
anthropologists allege that such a segregationist frame was brought forward by
the Aryans once their power over most of what is now India was totally secured.
Therefore it seems that power grasp was prior to the set up of a segregationist
ideology. This thesis remains nevertheless much controversial, especially as the
text in question is still very much revered and considered as a revelation.
Much less controversial is the theory according to which the Aryans assigned
a very low status to the submitted Indian natives, whose descendants are the
actual outcasts. Indeed as the natives did not have the same religion as the in-
vaders they were not included in the caste system (therefore labelled "outcasts")
and assigned humiliating statuses and occupations. It seems that through this
invasion, conquerors took over most of the powers and generated a segregated
society. Some sociologists such as Dehejia (1993) support the idea that the
caste system in India was quite exible until the Medieval age when land grant-
ing replaced cash salaries. Land was progressively granted mostly to the higher
castes, starting a feudalization process that made lower caste dependent on the
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higher-ups. "Concurrent with the feudalization of India was the ossication of
the once exible caste system".
Another good example is the jâti ssion process that has been widely ob-
served and commented. Indian society is made of a very large number of groups
the jâtis, whose features are the prohibition of relationships especially strict en-
dogamy rules, hierarchy and professional specialization. When questioned about
his caste any Indian will refer to his jâti. One is born in a jâti and cannot leave
it. It has been observed that as soon as a fringe of one jâti becomes wealthy or
more powerful, this sub-group will adopt a number of customs including rules in
allowed relationship that aim at improving its status. This new group will ban
any relationship with the group they want to escape from, takes a new name
and adopt customs that are more adequate to their desired status. This process
is referred to as "Sanskritization" by sociologists. It seems that a decisive im-
provement in the scope of opportunities leads to a rejection of those who do not
benet from the same kind of perspectives.
The Sanskritization process could be considered as the materialization of the
yearning by one group to gain association with another and as Srinivas (1955)
noted, this can lead to a severe rejection and its corollary discrimination. "Dis-
crimination against the Smiths occurs everywhere in peninsular India, possibly
as a result of their attempts in the past to rise high in the caste hierarchy by
means of a thorough Sanskritization of their customs". This conrms our re-
sult that segregation originates from the desire of one group to associate with
another.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper aims at providing an analytical framework of a phenomenon, namely
segregation, that is often considered as exogenous and intricate. We have tried
to break up the process of segregation formation, drawing from this analysis
two interesting points.
Firstly, segregation is not the result of psychological factors and does not
come of the mighty group. Rather, it stems from a socioeconomic context in
which one group seizes power. Power should be understood in a broad sense,
that is to say the ability to give someone else additional opportunities that are
otherwise unreachable. Dominated groups members are given little choice but
to systematically cooperate with the mighty. A natural response to a potential
partners ensured cooperation is to reject the relationship. This is what the
powerful group will do. The dominated group will best reply to this situation
by in turn rejecting cooperation. A stable segregation equilibrium is set. Such
an equilibrium is the product of strategic "microdecisions", as Schelling put
it, that have little to do with prejudice, discrimination and other pyschological
factors. It is our belief that discrimination arises from segregation and not the
opposite.
Secondly, segregation equilibria are triggered by power distribution within
the mighty group at the time of power capture. It has been shown that whenever
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power is widely shared by members of the dominant group, society may be
trapped in a segregation equilibrium. On the contrary, when power is grasped
by only a small fraction of the powerful group, society may converge towards a
mixed equilibrium. Please note that an economic denition of power has been
taken so far, although it is believed that the analysis could apply to any kind
of power such as religious and symbolic ones.
One point should be made clear. One of the points made in this article
is to explain why do some societies move towards a segregation equilibrium
and others do not. Power distribution within the dominant group at the time of
power takeover appears as the trigger. Once segregation is set, it is a remarkably
stable equilibrium. Variations in power distribution within the dominant group
as well as in the perception by the Ls of the value of relationships with Hs
will not modify the equilibrium. No group will have any interest in raising its
probability to be cooperative, knowing that the other groups probability is null.
As a consequence, it may be quite di¢ cult to explain what makes a society move
from a segregation trap to a mixed equilibrium. This question is left open.
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